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From Legislature To Litigation: 
The Real Medical Malpractice 
Crisis 
Despite a rare unanimity among plain-
tiffs counsel and defense attorneys alike 
that the legislatively created Health Claims 
Arbitration Office should be abolished, 
the system has "celebrated" its ten year 
anniversary and hardly an accolade was 
heard. Instead, amendment after amend-
ment is being heaped upon the statute to 
create temporary plugs in the statutory 
wall that is purported to be preventing a 
veritable flood of medical malpractice liti-
gation from reaching the circuit courts of 
our state. The wisdom of this "band aid" 
legislation is questionable, at best, and as is 
demonstrated herein, may be in direct con-
travention of the stated purpose of the cre-
ation of the Health Claims Arbitration 
Office - to reduce the cost of achieving res-
olution of medical malpractice claims 
(including the cost of defending the claims) 
with a corresponding reduction in 
insurance rates. 1 Section 3-2A-01 et seq. of 
the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article 
(" Act") governs actions pending before 
the Health Claims Arbitration Office. 
Recent changes, however, have made the 
system, in addition to being seen as ineffec-
tive in many cases, also unworkable. It is 
these legislative ambiguities that have led, 
and will continue to lead parties to seek 
judicial intervention and interpretation -
steps that further increase the cost of 
medical malpractice litigation. 
The problem with the legislation first 
manifests itself in the definitional section, 
Section 3-2A-01. With the advent of 
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HMOs and related prepaid health plans, 
the statute provides no clear statement as 
to inclusion or exclusion of such organiza-
tions under the definition of "health care 
provider."2 It has, therefore, been for the 
courts to resolve whether the statute 
requires that a physician or nurse affiliated 
with such an organization be subject, 
exclusively, to the jurisdiction of the 
Health Claims Arbitration Office, while 
the "employer" is not and may only be 
sued in the circuit court or federal district 
court in the appropriate venue. See Group 
Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 295 Md. 104, 
453 A.2d 1198 (1983). Such an interpreta-
tion results in the splitting of a cause of 
action - a situation clearly contrary to the 
concept of judicial economy. Defense of 
what would ordinarily be a single claim, in 
two judicial jurisdictions is not, however, 
a new problem under the Health Claims 
Arbitration statute. Following its enact-
ment, the problem most frequntly arose 
and still arises today, when the initial 
injury to the claimant is in the nature of an 
auto tort or products liability claim and 
the treatment for the injury is alleged, fore-
see ably, to have been rendered negligently. 
The inability of an HCA panel to obtain 
jurisdiction over the manufacturer of a 
product or over the driver of an automo-
bile makes it impossible to have such a 
claim resolved, initially, in a single trial. 
The future course of this problem and the 
cost ramifications may be frightening. 
With the increase in the development and 
use of medical products it is foreseeable 
that more and more malpractice cases will 
involve an entity which, under the statute, 
is technically not a health care provider 
and therefore not subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the Health Claims Arbitration 
Office. 
Further, as Maryland authorizes practice 
by more and more para-professionals, the 
definitional section of the Act gets more 
and more outdated and, consequently, 
unworkable - almost to the point of requir-
ing that the statute be construed contrary 
to the legislative intent of requiring all 
health care providers, of any sort, to 
initially, submit claims against them to 
arbitration. For example, are CRNAs, 
respiratory therapists, physician's assis-
tants, psychologists, lab technicians (the 
list grows longer), health care providers 
under the statute? Do they render health 
care? Could they fail to render health care? 
Could they cause medical injury? Does not 
the statute, on its face, giving it's required 
plain meaning, exclude such individuals or 
is it contrary to the intent to require that 
an anesthesiologist who administers 
anesthesia submit his claim to arbitration 
while a CRNA, administering the very 
same anesthesia, must defend him or her-
self, initially, in the circuit court. 
The legislative ambiguities are far from 
limited to the definitional section of the 
statute. The state's highest courts have 
been called upon on several occasions to 
construe Section 3-2A-02, entitled "Exclu-
siveness of Procedures." While it is gener-
ally understood that the Act is meant to 
relate to traditional malpractice cases only, 
by drafting the statute in such a fashion 
that it is said to apply to "[a]ll claims, suits 
and actions ... by a person against a health 
care provider for medical injury ... ,"3 the 
legislature was inviting submission to arbi-
tration any claims against physicians that 
allegedly resulted in personal injury inclu-
ding claims which sounded in QSSault, bat-
tery, slander, etc. The applicability of the 
statute has now been judicially, as com-
pared to legislatively, limited to claims 
arising from a violation of the health care 
providers' professional duty to exercise the 
appropriate care required for a health care 
provider in a professional setting. See Can· 
non v. McKen, 296 Md. 227,459 A.2d 196 
(1983); Nichols v. Wilson, 296 Md. 154,460 
A.2d 57 (1983). 
Section 3-2A-03, while not the subject of 
many appellate opinions, is often describ-
ed as a procedural nightmare. With best 
intention, that section mandates that a 
panel be comprised of a lawyer (presuma-
bly to offer advice on legal issues), a health 
care provider (presumably to offer advice 
on medical issues), and a lay person (to 
offer common sense?). Up until July 1, 
1986 any member of the Bar could be 
selected as panel chairman - the person 
charged with making all legal rulings both 
pre-trial and during trial. Recognizing that 
potentially multi-million dollar law suits 
were being decided by individuals who had 
never seen the inside of a courtroom, this 
section was recently amended to require 
that the attorney be in the practice of law 
in Maryland for three years.4 Where, how-
ever, is it written that a panel chairman 
must have tried a single case, made a single 
objection, practiced in the area of general 
negligence work or, be familiar with the 
statute and the case law construing the sta-
tute? Is this amendment in the legislation 
going to provide a solution to the problem 
of ill-prepared attorneys acting as panel 
chairmen and practicing outside of their 
specialties? 
And what of the health care provider 
panelist? For years, although the legisla-
tion provided that the list from which 
counsel were to select the panelist must, if 
practicable, include at least one health care 
provider from each recognized specialty 
(presumably, although not written, each 
recognized specialty, at issue), because of 
the voluntary nature of the service on the 
panels, because of the low compensation, 
because of the great inconvenience, and 
because of the time consuming nature of 
the panel hearings, actively practicing phy-
sicians in the specialities involved who 
could actually provide some medical infor 
mation to the other panelists regarding the 
applicable standards of care when the treat-
ment was rendered, are almost never par-
ticipating. Recognizing this shortcoming, 
more amendments were made. Now every 
physician who is licensed in this state and 
who is a resident of this state is required to 
be available to serve. Does this mean that 
they shall serve? No. Does this mean that 
if they do agree to serve that they must 
appear? No. Does this guarantee or even 
increase the probabilities that a specialist 
that can offer insight into the litigation 
will participate? No. 
One of the most significant legislative 
band aids was enacted in July of 1986 
when Section 3-2A-04 was amended to 
require the filing of a Certificate of a 
Qualified Expert by the claimant within 
90 days of the filing of suit, and by the 
health care provider within 120 days of the 
CCissues of 
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claimant's filing. While, on its face, this 
seems consistent with the statutory pur-
pose and intent, issues of constitutionality 
(which challenges the legislation, as a 
whole, survived years ago)5, have arisen 
again. Specifically, constitutional scholars 
must question whether to require all 
health care providers, if they wish to con-
test liability, to forward and find an expert 
to support their care or to say that their 
care did not proximately cause harm, 
when the burden of proof is on the claim-
ant, is appropriate.6 And, lest we forget, 
what about the hospital or other health 
care providing institution who is merely 
alleged to be vicariously liable? Can they 
be required to go forward and find an 
expert supporting their alleged employee's 
care even though no employer-employee 
relationship, in fact, exists? Further, one 
must question the wisdom of establishing 
the due date for the health care provider's 
certificate based on the date of the filing of 
the claimant's certificate and not upon 
service. This anomaly often results in a 
given defendant's certificate being due 
under the statute before service of process 
has been made. 
And what about the certificates them-
selves? Where is the guidance as to their 
contents? Must a claimant, in suing multi-
ple physicians, file a certificate that says 
each was negligent and that each prox-
imately caused harm? May a health care 
provider sign his own certificate? What of 
the requirement that the attesting physi-
cian (who is frequently not testifying at the 
Health Claims Arbitration hearing) be 
available for discovery? What attorney, in 
the routine case, would depose a physician 
who is not going to appear? Is this consis-
tent with efforts to reduce litigation costs, 
or are all of these issues going to be beg-
gingjudicial clarification and intervention? 
It goes without saying that Section 3-2A-
06 entitled "Judicial review" has been an 
area from which more appellate issues 
have arisen than other aspect of the litiga-
tion. See, generally, Brothers v. Sinai Hospi· 
ta~ 63 Md. App. 235, 492 A.2d 656 (1985); 
Mitcherling 'V. Rosselli, 61 Md. App. 113, 
484 A.2d 1060 (1984), affd, 304 Md. 363, 
499 A.2d 476 (1985); Tranen 'V. AzzZ. 59 
Md. App. 528, 476 A.2d 1170 (1984). 
Despite that fact, however, in the past two 
legislative sessions, little or no effort has 
been made to streamline the appellate pro-
cess for cases subject to the Health Care 
Malpractice Claims Act despite the fre-
quency with which these cases are appeal-
ed. 
This commentary would be unfair if it 
did not recognize some of the merits of the 
Health Care Malpractice Claims Act and 
the efforts of those administrating the Act 
and practicing under the Act. It would, 
likewise, be unfair not to comment on 
recent legislative changes which are benefi-
cial and consistent with the stated purpose 
of the Act. For example, Section 3-2A-
02(c), for the first time, has been amended 
to provide that, except as otherwise 
indicated, the Maryland Rules of Proce-
dure shall apply to practice under the sub-
title. This issue, in the past, had been left 
to the discretion of the panel chairperson. 
Additionally, an amendment to Section 3-
2A.(J6 provides for the admissibility of 
depositions taken in connection with the 
arbitration proceeding and mandating the 
binding nature of previously filed Inter-
rogatories, Requests for Admission of Fact 
and Requests for Production of Docu-
ments, will, hopefully, reduce the discov-
ery expenses assosciated with a de novo 
appeal. Section 3-2A-07(a) providing for 
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the payment of costs of the proceeding and 
reasonable expenses, including attorneys' 
fees, by a party, an attorney, or both, if the 
arbitration panel finds that maintaining 
the proceeding or defending the proceed-
ing is in bad faith or without substantial 
justification, may deter frivilous law suits 
and give the arbitration panel the same 
power that has been afforded our circuit 
courts in discouraging such litigation. 
Finally, this commentary would not be 
complete without acknowledging the 
efforts of the 1987 General Assembly in 
enacting legislation which, while 
applicable to medical malpractice cases, are 
not part of the Health Care Malpractice 
Claims Act. For example, the "remittitur 
bill" which is applicable to medical mal-
practice cases only, allows, but does not 
require, the court to receive evidence of 
collateral source payments. Further, in the 
area of malpractice, a change in the statute 
of limitations with respect to the filing of 
claims by a minor, will shorten the 
number of years for which physicians 
treating minors are at risk. Specifically, in 
medical malpractice cases only, a claimant 
must file suit either within three years 
from the date of discovery or five years 
from the date of injury, whichever is 
shorter, once the claimant reaches 11 years 
of age. Section 5-109 of the Courts & Judi-
cial Proceedings Article of the Annotated 
Code of Maryland remains applicable to 
medical malpractice cases and sets forth 
the statute of limitations for adults and 
remains applicable to minors when the 
cause of action is related to foreign objects 
left in the body or injury to the reproduc-
tive organs. 
Conclusion 
It remains to be seen whether the 
attempted legislative resuscitation of the 
Act will breathe new life into the 
insurance industry or will result in a long 
and painful death due to increasingly 
expensive litigation. 
Notes 
1 Although the Health Care Malpractice Oaims Act 
has remained in full force and effect for more than a 
decade, Medical Mutual Liability Insurance Society 
of Maryland, the state's largest insurer of physicians, 
continues, each year, to request and receive authori-
zation for significant premium increases. 
'It is one of the cardinal rules of statutory construc-
tion that provides that when the legislature has cho-
sen to make express mention of one item in a defini-
tion, the exclusion of others is implied. In the case of 
the Health Care Malpractice Oaims Act, the legisla-
ture listed as health care providers, a hospital, a phy-
sician, an osteopath, an optometrist, a chiropractor, 
a registered or licensed practical nurse, a dentist, a 
podiatrist, and a physical therapist. 
• There are other issues lurking within the confines of 
this section including, for example, where, jurisdic-
tionally, one health care provider seeks indemnity or 
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contribution from another health care provider 
when the underlying litigation was traditional mal-
practice. 
<This requirement is qualified, however, by Section 3-
2A~3(c) (3) (ii) which provides that if the attorney's 
name appeared on the list of persons willing to serve 
before January I, 1986, then that person continues to 
be eligible to serve. 
-Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 174, appeal dis-
missed. 439 U.S. 805 (1978) 
• Section 3-2A~4 (b) (2) provides, inter alia, that if the 
defendant disputes liability and fails to file a cenifi-
cate within 120 days from the date the claimant filed 
his cenificate, aU issues of liability will be 
adjudicated against the defendant. 
Patti G. Zimmerman is a graduate of 
Johns Hopkins University and the Universi-
ty of Baltimore School of Law. She is a 
member of the Bar Association of Baltimore 
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Case. . 
(continued from page 17) 
Notes: 
1 Blum, Ccut:h Potatoes, tbe Nt!fII Nightlife New York 
vol. 20 n. 28 July 20, 1987 at 26 
2Jd. 
'Sullivan, BlacJ. and White in Living Color Canadian 
Business vol. 60 February 1987 at 59 
< tbe Color Guard, Rosenfeld The Washington Post, 
May 13, 1987 at Fl 
-Sullivan, BlacJ. and White in Living Color Canadian 
Busines vol. 60 at 59.6Q 
• Alfred Bell Co. v. CataJda Fine Arts 191 F.2d 99 
(1951) 
7Hearings on the Colorization of Black-and White 
Motion Pictures Before the Subcommittee on Tech-
nology and the Law of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee (Statement of Professor Paul Goldstein) 
lOOth Cong. 1st Sess. (May 12, 1987) 
• /Junmps-Giles LithograJhic Co. v. Sarony 111 U.S. 
53; 4 S. Ct. 179; 28 1.. Ed. 349 (1884) 
'Grms v. Seligman 212 F. 930 (1914) 
10 37 C.F.R. S202.1(a) 
1152 Fed. Reg. 23,443 (proposed June 22, 1987) 
"Id. 
"Id. 
HId. 
"Id. 
16 AFI Squara Off Against Colorization, McCarthy 
Variety, vol. 324 October 8, 1986 at 5 
"Variety, vol. 324 October IS, 1986 at 5 
IIHearings on the Colorization of Black and White 
Motion Pictures before the Subcommittee on Tech-
nology and the Law of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee (Written statement of Rob Ward, President 
of Hal Roach Studios) lOOth Cong. lst Ses. (May 12, 
1987) 
"Hearings on Colorization before Senate Judiciary 
Committee (Statement of Roger 1.. Mayer, Presi-
dent, Turner Entenainment Co.) l00th Cong. 1st 
Sess. (May 12, 1987) 
'0 Trnting Males Film Buffi See Red, Gagliano The Wall 
Street Journal, Jan. 12, 1987 at 25 
21 The Color Guard, Rosnfield The Washington POSt, 
May 13, 1987 at F8 
"Variety, vol. 324 October 8, 1987 at 5 
23 Ni,mner on Copyright, Melville B. Nimmer West 
Publishing Company, S 1.03 [A] 
24Krauthammer, Casablanca in Colorll'm Shocleed, 
Shocked! Time Jan. 12, 1987 at 82 
'SId. 
26 Hearings on Colorization before Senate Judiciary 
Committee (Statement of Professor Paul Goldstein) 
lOOth Cong. lst Sess. (May 12, 1987) 
'7 H.R. 2400, 100th Congress, lst Sess. 1987 
·''100 Cong. Ret. E1922 
"Id. 
.old. 
Joseph J. Libricz, Jr., is a third year stu-
dent at the University of Baltimore School of 
Law. Mr. Libricz also serves as a Law Forum 
Staff Editor. 
act." Id. After both parties successfully had 
the motion dismissed, Allstate appealed. 
Writing for the majority in the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, Chief Judge 
Gilbert found the vexing issue presented 
by this case to be: "whether an insurer 
may. .. after disposition of the tort mat-
ter, relitigate the same issues and obtain a 
declaratory judgment... that overrides 
the jury's verdict on the tort action." Id. 
The court found that even though Allstate 
was not a party to the tort action, it is nev-
ertheless bound by the jury's verdict. 
The court cited Brohawn 'Cl. Tran· 
samerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 
854 (1975) as being similar with respect to 
the conflict between an insurer and an 
insured. The conflict in Brohawn arose out 
of a complaint that alleged separate and 
alternative theories of negligence and 
assault and battery. The insurer insisted 
because of the conflicting legal theories 
averred against its insured, the extent of 
policy coverage (due to an exclusionary 
clause similar to the case here) should be 
resolved prior to trial in a declaratory 
action. Although the Brohawn court 
noted, as did the court here, that the above 
contention is not without merit, it held 
that a declaratory action is inappropriate 
where the questions of fact to be resolved 
in the declaratory action are also to be liti-
gated in the pending action. Id. 
The court, in its application of Brohawn, 
found that while an insurer's right to pre-
liminary adjudication on an insured's right 
to coverage under an insurance policy is 
limited, it is not a compelling enough 
reason to allow an insurer to adjudicate 
issues that will be subsequently litigated at 
trial. Allstate, 71 Md. App. at 1069, 523 
A2d. at 1069. 
The court further pointed out that 
Brohawn as applied did not strip away all 
of Allstate's defenses. To begin, the court 
refused to read Brohawn as a bar to an 
insurance carrier's ability to be a party to 
the action. Nothing in the cited authority 
forbids the carrier, after supplying inde-
pendent counsel to its insured or paying 
the cost of the insured's choice of counsel, 
from intervening as a party and from being 
represented at a tort trial. 
Thus, to limit the more severe implica-
tions of this holding, the court placed the 
locus of the blame on Allstate for its fail-
ure to intervene, not on Allstate being 
denied its right to representation. 
The court in AtUlood clearly indicates 
that a more affirmative role should be 
played by the insurance carrier in tort liti-
gation in which a plaintiff pleads alter-
native legal theories of which one will be 
excluded by the scope of the policy at trial. 
Implicitly the court held firm in its unwil 
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lingness to compromise a jury verdict on 
an issue of liability, despite the fact that 
extrinsic evidence may reveal that the 
jury's finding may well fall into an 
insurance carrier's exclusionary' provision. 
. -Michael T. Wyatt 
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